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Abstract
Using a substantially larger sample than has been used before, 
and a sample that includes the Great Financial Crisis and its ensuing 
recession, I investigate the stock market reaction to securities class action 
filings following the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act through the first quarter of 2012. I find that, on average, 
even after adjusting for market downturns, there is a statistically 
significant negative abnormal return at the time of filing. There is also a 
statistically significant negative abnormal return during the weeks 
preceding the filing indicating that the market partially, but not fully, 
anticipates these filings. Additionally I find the following: filings that 
include a § 10(b) claim have a more adverse impact than those that do 
not; filings that are subsequently dismissed have a smaller adverse 
impact than those that are not, indicating that the market has some ability 
to distinguish between claims with different degrees of merit; filings in 
the Ninth Circuit have a more adverse impact than others, especially 
when compared with the Second Circuit; and finally, filings against non-
service sector firms have a more adverse impact than those against 
service sector firms, and financial firms in the service sector suffer more 
when claims are filed than non-financial service firms.
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been many attempts to assess the impact of securities 
class action filings.1 Some of these have been speculative in nature and 
some have been empirical. 2 Some of the empirical work has been 
anecdotal, and some has been statistical. 3 The passing of the Private 
1 See generally Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1476-1507 (2004) (surveying numerous empirical 
investigations of securities class actions).
2 See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the 
Arduous, and Now Often Fatal, Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law 
Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 3-5 (1996) (providing a persuasive, but 
speculative, analysis of the state of securities class actions); James D. Cox et al., 
Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities 
Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1589-90 (2006) (providing an 
empirical inquiry into the performance of the lead plaintiff provision in 
securities class actions).
3 See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ 
and Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 
759-60 (2009) (conducting an anecdotal study based on the interviews of over 
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Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)4 prompted even more 
effort towards attempting to assess whether the legislation resulted in any 
of its desired objectives.5
Surprisingly, there has been relatively little use of event studies 
to investigate the impact. Event study methodology is a powerful tool 
that has been exploited heavily in academic studies in finance since it 
was first introduced in 1969 by Fama, Fischer, Jensen, and Roll.6 There 
have been thousands of published event studies, and even more working 
papers and unpublished Ph.D. dissertations.7 Although event studies are 
not a staple of legal research, they have been used repeatedly by 
Professor Roberta Romano to examine the impact of reincorporation, 
takeover statutes, and shareholder derivative suits.8 Scholars have also 
utilized event study methodology in legal research, such as investigating 
the wealth effects of inter-firm litigation.9
There has been one publication in the field of finance that uses 
event study methodology to investigate post PSLRA securities class 
fifty people involved in securities class action settlements); James D. Cox et al., 
There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of 
Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 367 (2008) 
(conducting statistical analysis of 773 settlements).
4 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 & 18 U.S.C.).
5 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 600 (2007) 
(providing an empirical assessment of the impact of the PSLRA on meritorious 
litigation).
6 Eugene F. Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10
INT’L ECON. REV. 1, 3-4 (1969).
7 A February 12, 2014 search on the term “event study” in abstracts in the SSRN 
library produced 1,294 papers. Cf. JOHN Y. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE 
ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 149 (1997) (“The general applicability 
of the event-study methodology has led to its wide use.”).
8 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the 
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, 
Law as a Product] (conducting event study on impact of reincorporating); 
Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV.
111, 181-87 (1987) (reporting event study of takeover statutes); Roberta 
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 55, 65-67 (1991) (providing results for an event study of shareholder 
derivative suits).
9 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Shareholder Wealth Implications of 
Corporate Lawsuits, 27 FIN. MGMT. 5, 15 (1998) (measuring wealth effects of 
corporate lawsuit filings and settlements using event study methodology).
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action filings; however, that paper only utilizes data through 2003.10 The 
strength of financial research methodology is the ability to construct very 
powerful statistical tests.11 Strengths, however, are often coupled with 
weaknesses—the proverbial double-edged sword. In order to get power 
behind the test statistics used in event study methodology, it is necessary 
to have very large data sets. 12 Collection of large data sets requires 
patience, as time must pass to generate the data.13 The passage of time 
coupled with the recent financial crisis creates both a larger data set and 
the possibility of more sources of variation in the data, which improves
our ability to statistically discern small impacts.14 The purpose of this 
article is to provide an event study of securities class action filings using 
a larger data set than has been done previously, and to make the study 
accessible to the legal scholars who have the ability to impact the future 
of securities regulation through public commentary, briefs, litigation 
support, and teaching future securities lawyers.15
I utilize the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse 
Database (SCAC), which contains data on all securities class action 
10 Amar Gande & Craig M. Lewis, Shareholder-Initiated Class Action Lawsuits: 
Shareholder Wealth Effects and Industry Spillovers, 44 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 823, 824 (2009).
11 Cf. CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 3 (“Financial economics is a highly 
empirical discipline, perhaps the most empirical among the branches of 
economics and even among the social sciences in general.”).
12 Cf. DAVID ANDERSON ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND 
ECONOMICS: ABBREVIATED EDITION 209 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining that the 
statistical margin of error is inversely related to the sample size).
13 Cf. MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 283 
(2d ed. 2001) (“Below the gold standard we have what are called observational 
studies. In such studies, as the name suggests, we do not create the data but 
assemble and examine what already exists.”).
14 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 201 (“[A] larger sample size will 
provide a smaller margin of error, a narrower interval, and greater precision.”).
15 See Mark Klock, Lessons Learned from Bernard Madoff: Why We Should 
Partially Privatize the Barney Fifes at the SEC, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 783, 832 (2010) 
(“If we [lawyers] had such preparation [in finance and analytical methods], we 
might have fewer financial catastrophes and panics.”); Jose Gabilondo, 
Financial Moral Panic! Sarbanes-Oxley, Financier Folk Devils, and Off-
Balance-Sheet Arrangements, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 781, 850 (2006) (“I call 
on my transactional law colleagues to foster more integration of analytical 
financial methods into a basic legal education. Such an approach might produce 
more transactional lawyers capable of spotting and stemming future financial 
moral panics.”).
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filings in federal court subsequent to the passage of the PSLRA.16 The 
first step was to download information about all filings from the 
beginning of the database in January 1996 to the end of the first quarter 
of 2012. This provided 3,457 securities class-action filings. The next step
was to match the firms in SCAC with the University of Chicago’s Center 
for Research in Security Prices database (CRSP) on stock returns for 
publicly traded exchange-listed and NASDAQ stocks. 17 The resulting 
sample contains 845 useable securities class action filing events with 
necessary stock return data to conduct an event study. This is 
substantially larger than any previous study.18
With this data, I am able to analyze the general overall impact of 
the filing of class-action lawsuits. I find evidence that the market reacts 
negatively to the mere filing of a class action, that some of the negative 
impact leaks into the market before the actual filing, and that there is no 
bounce subsequent to the filing.19 With this large sample, I am able to 
examine several other questions as well: whether the market is able to 
distinguish meritorious filings from meritless filings at the time of the 
filing; whether the market reacts stronger to different types of class 
action claims (e.g., general fraud, errors in the registration statement, 
tender offer violations, investment company act violations, breach of 
fiduciary duty); whether the market reacts stronger to claims brought in 
different circuits; and whether the market reacts stronger to claims in 
certain economic sectors (e.g., services, and financial services).
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II 
reviews prior literature on securities class actions. Section III describes 
the data used in the current study, and provides a basic introduction to 
statistical methods. Section IV explains the specific method used here—
the event study. Section V presents the statistical results and Section VI 
provides conclusions.
16 STAN. L. SCH. SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://perma.cc/5DKL-
F92V (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
17 Data Access Tools, CENTER FOR RES. IN SEC. PRICES, http://perma.cc/ASK2-
7QX8 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
18 See, e.g., Gande & Lewis, supra note 10, at 826 (“This reduces the sample for 
such analysis to 377 class action lawsuits.”).
19 See infra Table 2 (showing statistically significant negative reaction).
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II. PRIOR LITERATURE
A. Securities Class Actions before the PSLRA
Perhaps the earliest attempt to conduct an empirical study of 
securities class action litigation in the legal literature was performed by 
Janet Cooper Alexander. 20 Although Alexander’s study was 
commendable for attempting what others had not, it suffered some 
serious methodological shortcomings that caused the author’s conclusion
to be received with great skepticism.21 Alexander limited her analysis to 
one type of securities class action (lawsuits based on IPOs), during one 
six month period (the first half of 1983), and in one specific sector 
(computer-related companies). 22 As a result, she identified only 
seventeen potential companies,23 of which just nine were sued.24 Of these 
nine, only eight were settled at the time of her study. 25 Alexander 
attempted to draw some inferences between the strength of claims and 
the size of settlements, and argued that the data showed that the merits of 
a case are not reflected in the outcomes.26 But with a sample of only 
eight observations and many possible explanatory variables, she was not 
able, and did not attempt, to perform any statistical analysis.27
A more comprehensive study of securities class action lawsuits 
arising out of the new issues market was published in 1996 by James 
Bohn and Stephen Choi.28 They looked at all filings for a twelve-year 
period covering 1975 to 1986, and therefore avoided the small sample 
problems associated with the Alexander study.29 The focus of their study 
was to determine whether frivolous suits dominate meritorious suits, and 
20 Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991).
21 See, e.g., Baker & Griffith, supra note 3, at 757 (“Alexander’s article is still 
widely cited even though its empirical foundation has been undermined . . . .”).
22 Alexander, supra note 20, at 506.
23 Id. at 510.
24 Id. at 511-12.
25 Id. at 517.
26 See id. at 517 (calling the results striking); see also id. at 519 (concluding that 
“the outcomes of the sample cases either fall into a range so narrow that it can 
be described as a flat rate, or vary for reasons that can be explained by factors 
other than the merits”).
27 See generally Alexander, supra note 20.
28 James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical 
Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1996).
29 Id. at 912.
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Bohn and Choi concluded that they do.30 Additionally, using event study 
methodology, Bohn and Choi found that securities class action filings 
resulted in a statistically significant stock price drop around a three-day 
window of the time of filing regardless of merit, and that the market did 
not fully anticipate the filings.31 However, Bohn and Choi’s data ended 
long before the passage of the PSLRA, which was intended to curb 
abuses in securities class action filings.32 Thus, the empirical question of 
whether the PSLRA was successful remained unanswered after the 1996 
publication of Bohn and Choi’s research.
B. The PSLRA
The PSLRA was created to deter plaintiff’s attorneys from filing 
frivolous class action claims on the belief that such claims were 
prevalent and created unnecessary corporate expenses in litigating and 
settling strike suits.33 The Act created a number of procedural hurdles for 
filing class actions in federal court.34 One provision made it easier for 
institutional investors to take control of the litigation in the dual beliefs 
that institutional investors would more effectively monitor merit-based 
cases, and would be less inclined to pursue frivolous cases.35 Under the 
PSLRA, filings must advertise the action “in a widely circulated national 
business-oriented publication or wire service.”36 In the ninety-day period 
30 Id. at 979
31 Id. at 978.
32 Id. at 912.
33 See Mark Klock, Lighthouse or Hidden Reef? Navigating the Fiduciary Duty 
of Delaware Corporations’ Directors in the Wake of Malone, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 1, 31 (2000) (“This law was ostensibly intended to reduce perceived 
abuses in class actions brought in federal court under the securities laws.”).
34 See Branson, supra note 2, at 4 (“Because of the many instruments that now 
exist with which blows can be administered, only the toughest plaintiff who can 
be swift at times and crafty at others and who has an extraordinarily meritorious 
suit, generous funding, the most able of counsel, and extreme staying power will 
survive.”).
35 See Cox et al., supra note 2, at 1588 (“The lead plaintiff provision was 
adopted to encourage a class member with a large financial stake to become the 
class representative. Congress expected that such a plaintiff would actively 
monitor the conduct of a securities fraud class action so as to reduce the 
litigation agency costs . . . .”).
36 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 
101(a), 109 Stat. 737, 738 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1
(a)(3)(A)(i)).
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following publication, the court must consider motions by other 
purported class members to take control of the suit “as the ‘Most 
Adequate Plaintiff.’” 37 This deters smaller plaintiff’s attorneys from
making the effort to initiate an action.38 Other provisions require that the 
alleged fraud be pleaded with particularity and that discovery be stayed 
until defendants’ motions to dismiss are resolved.39 Some commentators 
have considered “[t]he PSLRA's most forceful blow to the securities 
class action [to be] the combination of the Act's tightened pleading 
requirements and its bar to discovery until the defendants' motions to 
dismiss have been resolved.”40
A great deal of commentary from securities law professors 
harshly criticized the PSLRA for dealing with a non-existent problem,
and for creating onerous obstacles to recovery for fraud. 41 These 
37 Id. at 739.
38 Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 
ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 547 (1997). Professor Fisch observes:
To the extent that the Reform Act allows small 
shareholders to file suit but permits institutional investors to 
take control of the litigation away from the filing plaintiff, it 
preserves for the small investor only the opportunity to incur 
the costs associated with drafting and filing a complaint and 
eliminates meaningful access to the judicial system. The 
anticipation that individual plaintiffs and their lawyers may 
lose control of filed cases through the appointment of others as 
lead plaintiffs also diminishes the incentive for smaller 
investors to investigate instances of fraud and initiate legal 
action.
Id.
39 See Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative 
Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1003, 1023 (1998) (discussing the Act’s heightened pleading requirements 
and stay of discovery).
40 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An 
Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L. J. 737, 741 (2003).
41 See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor 
Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities 
Laws: The Commission's Authority,” 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 457 (1994) 
(“What has been most lacking in the legislative debate to date has been authentic 
data that provides empirical or theoretical support for particularized law revision. 
If there is a case for significant changes in the federal securities class action law, 
it simply has not been presented to date.”); see also id. at 439-53 (criticizing 
studies that claimed to support a conclusion that securities class action strike 
suits were a significant problem).
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obstacles were widely considered to undermine investor protection and 
make it more difficult for honest firms to raise capital.42 Commentators 
attributed the flood of class action suits that led to the reforms as being 
the effects of the earlier tax-shelter wave, which had finished working its 
way through the courts, and the high-tech IPO wave, which was 
subsiding.43 One commentator described the specific provisions of the 
42 In the context of discussing the PSLRA, Professor Lynn Stout explained:
In lay terms, fraud is bad for securities markets because it 
erodes investor confidence. This occurs because fraud makes 
it difficult for investors to detect differences in the quality of 
the securities they buy. Companies issuing bad securities--
poorly run firms that throw away money and do a poor job for 
their investors--can sell their securities at about the same price 
as well-managed firms, because fraud makes it impossible for 
investors to easily distinguish between high-quality and low-
quality firms.
What happens in such a market? Very quickly the 
market gets flooded with bad firms, because fraud allows them 
to sell worthless securities at high prices. Until, of course, 
investors learn that they can't distinguish between good and 
bad companies. When that happens, investors begin to 
discount the quality of all the securities in the market. In other 
words, they lose confidence in the market, and will no longer 
pay high prices even to good firms selling quality securities. 
At this point, the good firms exit the market, because they 
can't get a decent price for their securities. The market comes 
to be dominated only by dubious firms willing to sell at very 
low prices because their securities are in fact worth even less. 
This is the "market for lemons" phenomenon first described by 
the economist George Ackerlof many years ago.
Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 713 (1996).
43 In Professor Branson’s words:
All of these extreme measures constitute a permanent solution 
taken in response to what undoubtedly will turn out to have 
been a temporary problem. If the federal courts have been 
flooded with securities cases, much of the flood was in 
response to the tax shelters put together in the 1980s. Much of 
the litigation that resulted was meritorious, but more 
importantly, the last of those cases is now working its way 
through the courts, and the flood has ebbed. Another source 
has been the so-called stockdrop lawsuit in which professional 
plaintiffs join with a cadre of plaintiffs' securities law firms to 
ascribe any precipitous price drop to nefarious actions within 
9
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Act as weapons in an arsenal intended to prevent a securities plaintiff 
from successfully running the gauntlet to get an opportunity for justice.44
C. Securities Class Actions after the PSLRA
Professors James Cox and Randall Thomas conducted an 
empirical analysis of securities class action filings on the tenth 
anniversary of the PSLRA.45 They did not use event study methodology,
nor examine the impact of filings on the stock market.46 Rather, they 
focused on whether the lead-plaintiff provision was successful in 
increasing the proportion of provable losses that are recovered in 
settlement.47 They were shocked to find that the percentage of provable 
losses recovered actually declined and suggested one interpretation of 
this finding is that if Congress wishes to help defrauded investors the 
PSLRA should be repealed in its entirety.48 In contrast to their findings, 
Michael Perino used a larger sample of pre- and post-PSLRA filings with 
more controls in his study and found that, in the cases where public 
pension funds serve as the lead plaintiff, recoveries are larger and 
attorneys’ fees are lower since the enactment of the PSLRA. 49
Additionally, Cox, Thomas and Bai conducted a follow-up study which 
found improvement in the performance of institutions serving as lead 
plaintiffs and concluded “that they add substantial value to the 
outcome.”50
smaller and newly public corporations. The increase in those 
suits merely tracks an explosion in initial public offerings 
(IPOs) made by high tech companies in 1992 and in 1993. The 
courts were well on their way to managing the explosion when 
Congress intervened.
See Branson, supra note 2, at 4-5.
44 Id. at 4.
45 See Cox et al., supra note 2, at 1589-90 (“Now, more than ten years after the 
enactment of the lead plaintiff provision . . . we inquire empirically whether the 
lead plaintiff provision has performed as projected.”).
46 See id. at 1591-92 (outlining their empirical methodology).
47 See id. (focusing on “the ratio of settlement amounts to provable losses” as 
“the most important indicator of whether investors are being compensated for 
their damages”).
48 Id. at 1592.
49 See Michael Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical 
Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 368, 369-70 (2012).
50 Cox et al., supra note 3, at 385.
10
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These conflicting results address only one narrow question as to 
the effectiveness of the lead-plaintiff provision of the PSLRA. Eric 
Helland looked at the broader question of whether allegations of fraud 
tend to be meritorious using a different methodology focusing on 
directors’ reputations.51
If private securities class actions alleging 
fraudulent behavior by officers or directors of a 
company are meritorious, directors and officers should 
pay a reputational penalty when they sit on a board of a 
company whose officers and directors are accused of 
fraud. I find little evidence of a negative effect 
associated with allegations of fraud. Using various 
definitions of board positions as a proxy for the 
reputation of directors who are accused of fraud, I find 
that the net number of board positions is consistently 
increased. Only in shareholder class actions in the top 
quartile of settlements or in which the Securities and 
Exchange Commission has initiated a case do directors 
appear to suffer a reputational penalty when a board they 
serve on is accused of fraud. The results call into 
question the merits of private securities class actions.52
Helland’s finding that directors suffer no adverse effects from 
class action lawsuits is not inconsistent with the conclusion that 
stockholders do suffer adverse effects. But clearly it is inconsistent with 
the conclusion that some researchers have drawn that the PSLRA has 
limited frivolous class actions, and that the lead-plaintiff provision is 
working well to improve recovery in meritorious actions. Many 
questions remain unanswered, or answered with conflicting inferences.
There has been one post PSLRA event study published in the 
finance literature. 53 Gande and Lewis also investigate shareholder-
initiated class action lawsuits and find a negative reaction to the filings of 
lawsuits as well as partial anticipation of the lawsuits by the market.54
51 Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities 
Litigation, 49 J. L. & ECON 365, 366 (2006) (“In this study I find that for the 
average case, there is no evidence of a negative effect on reputation associated 
with allegations of fraud. In fact, directors accused of fraud increase their net 
number of board positions for almost all measures of new board positions.”).
52 Id. at 365.
53 Gande & Lewis, supra note 10, at 824 (analyzing class action lawsuits 
initiated between 1996 and 2003).
54 Id. at 823.
11
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Their study differs from this study in several important respects. First, 
their sample ends in 2003, and therefore only covers half of the time 
covered in this study and excludes the Great Financial Crisis. 55 The 
current study contains 845 observations. Gande and Lewis have some 
results based on 605 observations, but since they are also interested in 
providing comparisons with some non-sued firms in the same industry as 
the sued firms, they must merge their sample with another database,
which does not contain data for many of their 605 observations. 56
Consequently, most of their analysis in confined to a subset of 377 
observations.57 Given that standard errors of estimates are proportional to 
the inverse of the square root of the number of observations, their 
standard errors will be approximately fifty percent larger than those in 
this study.58
Additional differences between the Gande and Lewis study and 
this study are that Gande and Lewis do not collect data on what happens 
to the filing (e.g., whether the suit settles, survives, or is dismissed on 
motion), the circuit in which the filing takes place, and the legal basis for 
the suit (e.g., § 10(b) or some other grounds). 59 The larger sample 
containing the Great Financial Crisis introduces more variation, and the 
possibility for achieving more precise calculation of the effects of 
filings.60 Additionally, the other variables collected provide some ability 
to assess other interesting questions, such as whether the legal basis for 
the filing leads to larger or smaller effects, whether the circuit in which 
the filing occurs matters, and whether the market is able to distinguish 
which filings are likely to be dismissed.
There is one other unpublished study that uses the Stanford 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database and covers filings
55 Id. at 824 (describing that the samples used consisted of suits filed in and 
before 2003).
56 Id. at 826 (“Our initial analysis of shareholder losses around a lawsuit filing 
date uses the full sample of 605 filings. However, our subsequent analysis . . . 
requires that firms (both sued and nonsued) also be available on Compustat and 
First Call.”).
57 Id.
58Ĝ845/Ĝ377=1.497.
59 Gande & Lewis, supra note 10, at 826-27 (describing data collected).
60 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 237 (giving the formula for the size 
of confidence interval, which just depends on three variables: significance level, 
variability of the population, and sample size).
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through 2006. 61 Jennings, Kedia, and Rajgopal investigate whether 
private and SEC initiated actions result in subsequently less aggressive 
accounting practices by peer firms in the same industry.62 They find that 
“[t]he average peer firm, subject to SEC action and/or litigation, reduces 
discretionary accruals equivalent to 14% to 22% of the median return on 
assets (ROA) in the aftermath of such enforcement.”63 Their study is 
obviously relevant to the policy debate about whether securities litigation 
provides benefits in the form of deterrence, but their methodology and 
the precise questions they investigate are different from this study.
It is clear that there continues to be differences of opinion about 
the effectiveness of the securities laws in the wake of the PSLRA.64 In 
this study, I use the largest available sample to investigate these 
questions. First, does the mere filing of a securities class action lawsuit 
result in a statistically significant negative reaction in the market place at
the time of filing? Second, is there a discernible negative reaction that 
occurs before the filing, indicating possible anticipation of the legal 
action? Third, does the market overreact to the announcement of the 
filing, which would be suggested if the price subsequently bounces back 
in the weeks following the commencement of litigation? Fourth, does the 
market have the same reaction to all filings or does the market react less 
to frivolous filings, defined as filings that are subsequently dismissed on 
motion? Fifth, is the magnitude of the market reaction related to the legal 
basis for the filing? Sixth, is the magnitude of the market reaction related 
to the circuit in which the filing occurs? And seventh, is the magnitude of 
the reaction related to the economic sector the business operates in?
61 See Jared Jennings et al., The Deterrent Effects of SEC Enforcement and 
Class Action Litigation, 13 (2011), available at http://perma.cc/M5U2-4D8D
(last visited February 12, 2014) (“We use the Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse to identify class action lawsuits filed between 1996 and 2006.”).
62 See id. at 1 (“[W]e investigate whether SEC enforcement actions and class 
action lawsuits, over the years 1996-2006, deter aggressive financial reporting 
behavior among the peers of fraudulent firms.”).
63 Id.
64 Compare Barbara Black, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
Inc.: Reliance on Deceptive Conduct and the Future of Securities Fraud Class 
Actions, SEC. REG. L. J., Summer 2008, at 6-7 (asserting that the PSLRA is 
ineffective), with Cox et al., supra note 3, at 386 (“[T]he PSLRA is working and 
likely working well.”).
13
Klock: Do Class Action Filings Affect Stock Prices? The Stock Market Rea
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
122 Journal of Business & Securities Law [Vol. 15
III. THE DATA AND STATISTICAL METHODS IN GENERAL
A. Data
This sample is drawn from all securities class action filings in 
federal court, as contained in the Stanford Securities Class Action 
database.65 3,586 records of class action filings were downloaded. From 
these, the 1,142 observations for which the firms exist in the CRSP 
database were identified. Of those, 845 actually contained the amount of 
data required during the period of study to use. These 845 observations 
form the baseline event study calculated to examine the question whether, 
on average, securities class action filings have a statistically discernible 
negative impact on stock price after adjusting for fluctuations in the 
overall market.
Table 1 describes the various subsamples that are investigated 
and the number of observations in each. The sample is split once based 
on the type of claim—10(b) versus not 10(b). The sample is also split on 
disposition—survived or dismissed. The sample is further split into 
filings in the Ninth Circuit, Second Circuit, and all other circuits
combined. The others are combined because individually each has a 
relatively small number of filings. Finally, the sample is split based on 
economic sector—non-services and services, and the service sector is 
further split into different components: financial services and the 
narrowly defined service sector. These last two categories are also 
combined to create a service sector that excludes transportation and 
communications services.
TABLE 1
Attributes of the Sample
Total # of filings in baseline event study 845
# involving 10(b) claims 723
# not involving 10(b) claims 122
65 STAN. L. SCH. SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 16.
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# which survived 502
# which were dismissed 343
# in the Ninth Circuit 189
# in the Second Circuit 312
# in all other circuits 344
# in Non-Services 400
# in Services 445
# in Financial Services 162
# in Narrow Service Sector (SIC 70-89) 206
B. Hypothesis Testing
If the filing of a class action lawsuit against a firm has no impact 
on the firm’s value, then, on average, firms with such filings should have 
actual returns equal to their anticipated returns at the time the claims are 
filed, and their abnormal return (the deviation between the actual and 
anticipated return) should be zero on average.66 There are several reasons 
66 See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I: 
Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141, 143 (2002) 
(“[A]n event is said to have an impact on the financial performance of a firm if it 
produces an abnormal movement in the price of the stock.”); id. at 148 
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why class action filings might not have any discernible impact at the time 
of filing.67 One is that the market might have already anticipated the 
filing and incorporated the impact into the firm valuation previously.68
Another reason is that the market might not care about filings because 
they are considered to be mostly frivolous and disposed of at low cost.69
And another reason is that the market could be inefficient, and react 
sluggishly to the filing days or weeks afterwards.70
Even if the average abnormal return on the event date is different 
from zero, we cannot immediately conclude that the event had an impact 
on firm value because if the true impact is zero, deviations from zero will 
be observed by random chance in the sampling process.71 In order to 
conclude that the event impacts firm value, the deviation must be large 
enough to be statistically discernible, meaning too large to believe that it 
occurred by random chance if there really was no impact.72 This is what 
statisticians and statistical researchers refer to as statistical significance.73
(explaining that the abnormal return is zero “if an event has no impact on firm 
value”).
67 See, e.g., Gande & Lewis, supra note 10, at 829 (explaining that the impact 
could be mitigated “because firms carry insurance that is designed to defray the
cost of class action lawsuits,” and “industry experts believe that settlement 
amounts are highly correlated with policy limits”).
68 See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 179-80 (explaining that events which 
are anticipated in advance, for one example regulatory changes, will not result in 
a change in value at the actual time of the anticipated event).
69 See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: 
Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 404-05 (2002) 
(explaining that price will not react to corporate events that do not affect 
corporate value).
70 See STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 343-44 (6th ed. 2002) 
(explaining that a market which is not efficient will have a lengthy delay in the 
price response to new information).
71 See, e.g., Mark Klock, Finding Random Coincidences While Searching for the 
Holy Writ of Truth: Specification Searches in Law and Public Policy or Cum 
Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc?, 2001 WISC. L. REV. 1007, 1018 & n.71 (explaining in 
detail how deviations from the population mean occur in random samples).
72 See id. at 1018-19 (explaining that in order to conclude that an estimate is 
different from a hypothesized value, it must be far enough from that value to 
conclude that the difference is unlikely due to random chance).
73 See Mark Klock, Cooperation and Division: An Empirical Analysis of Voting 
Similarities and Differences During the Stable Rehnquist Court Era—1994 to 
2005, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 537, 570 (2013) (explaining statistical 
significance).
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Classical hypothesis testing involves specifying a maintained 
hypothesis (called the null) and then using data to either reject the null or 
accept the null.74 There are four possible outcomes: a true null can be 
accepted; a true null can be rejected; a false null can be accepted; a false 
null can be rejected.75 The second and third outcomes involve errors, and 
they are labeled Type I and Type II error, respectively.76 The probability 
of a Type I error is set by the statistical researcher and is also called the 
level of significance.77 Thus, a 10% significance level means that the 
statistician has set limits such that if the null hypothesis were true, it 
would not be falsely rejected 90% of the time.78 A 1% significance level 
means that the statistician has set limits such that if the null hypothesis 
were true, it would not be falsely rejected 99% of the time.79 Statistically 
significant differences from zero means that the discrepancies are so 
large as to be very unlikely to have been generated by random chance if 
the null of no difference were true, hence, we reject the null in this 
case.80
Discrepancies are measured in standard deviations. 81 For 
estimates, the size of the standard deviation decreases with the size of the 
sample.82 This means that for large samples, small discrepancies can be 
many standard deviations away from zero. 83 Thus, the size of the 
discrepancy required to have statistical significance diminishes with the 
74 See Klock, supra note 71, at 1018 (explaining that a sample is used to test a 
null hypothesis against an alternative).
75 Id. at 1020.
76 See id. (defining Type I and Type II errors).
77 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 225–26 (explaining the meaning of 
Type I error and significance level).
78 See id. DWH[SODLQLQJWKDWVWDWLVWLFDOVLJQLILFDQFHDWWKHĮOHYHOPHDQVWKDW
the discrepancy is large enough that if in fact the true difference were zero, a 
GLVFUHSDQF\RIWKDWPDJQLWXGHZRXOGRQO\RFFXUZLWKDSUREDELOLW\RIĮ
79 Cf. Klock, supra note 73, at 573 (“At a 5% level of significance, my test 
statistic will incorrectly reject a true null hypothesis 5% of the time, if the 
sampling is done correctly.”).
80 Id. at 570-71.
81 See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 13, at 21 (describing that 
standardization of random variables “expresses the variable or data in terms of 
numbers of standard deviations from the mean”).
82 See id. at 20 (stating that the standard deviation of the sample mean is ³/Ĝn).
83 Klock, supra note 71, at 1018 (“The probability of getting an estimate of a 
given size error approaches zero as the sample size increases . . . .”).
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sample size.84 To illustrate this point, consider an effort to collect data to 
determine whether heads and tails are equally likely. Suppose that a coin 
is flipped twice. If heads and tails really are equally likely, half of the 
time the data will result in two of the same results.85 However, if we flip 
a coin four hundred times and heads and tails are equally likely, 90% of 
the time this experiment is done the proportion of flips that come up 
heads will be between 46% and 54%.86 If we quadruple the sample size, 
we will cut the margin of error in half.87 Thus, the larger the sample size, 
the easier we can discern a false null hypothesis.88
IV. EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY
As everyone knows, the stock market is volatile.89 Thus, when 
an event such as the filing of a lawsuit happens, a drop in price cannot 
necessarily be ascribed to that event since the market might have had a 
down day causing most stocks to have a price drop.90 Likewise, a small 
increase in stock price on the day of a bad event might still be considered 
a negative effect if the market had a strong rally that day and most stock 
prices rose substantially.91 In order to assess the impact of the event on 
84 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 237 (showing that the size of the 
margin of error is proportional to 1/Ĝn where n is the sample size).
85 Klock, supra note 71, at 1018 (describing the possible outcomes in a random 
sample of two).
86 This is calculated as .5 f 1.645(.5/Ĝ400). See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra 
note 13, at 171 (giving the formula for this calculation).
87 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 237 (showing that the size of the 
margin of error is proportional to 1/Ĝn where n is the sample size, hence when 
n increases by a factor of 4, the margin of error is cut in half).
88 See id. (observing that the do-not-reject region for a null hypothesis becomes 
smaller as the sample size becomes larger).
89 See ROSS ET AL., supra note 70, at 348 (“[S]tock prices fluctuate from day to 
day.”).
90 Cf. Choi, supra note 1, at 1478-79 (discussing the weakness in studies that 
involve a single calendar date due to their inability to eliminate the possibility of 
a confounding event that moved prices on that day).
91 See ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 355 (9th ed. 2011) (explaining how to 
calculate damages using the actual return relative to the expected return based 
on general market movements); FREDERIC S. MISHKIN & STANLEY G. EAKINS,
FINANCIAL MARKETS & INSTITUTIONS 129 (7th ed. 2012) (explaining that if 
good news is announced but not as good as what was anticipated the price 
declines).
18
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 15 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol15/iss2/3
Spring] Do Class Action Filings Affect Stock Prices? 127
the stock market, we need to have a model of normal returns.92 The 
actual returns are then differenced from the normal returns to calculate 
abnormal returns.93 With a large sample of events, statistical tests can be 
conducted on the abnormal returns to determine whether they are 
statistically discernible from zero—that is, whether the differences are 
unlikely to be due to random chance fluctuations.94 The most prevalent 
model of normal returns adjusts returns for both the specific stock risk 
and the overall stock market. This is known as “risk and market adjusted 
returns,” or the market model.95
Event study methodology was first introduced by Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen, and Roll with a publication in February 1969.96 They used data 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) collected at the 
University of Chicago.97 At the time, the database contained monthly 
price and dividend data on all New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed 
stocks from January 1926 to December 1960.98 More recent versions of 
the data contain daily data, as well as data on NASDAQ stocks 
beginning December 1962.99
Subsequent to the first event study, event studies have been 
conducted in massive quantities by doctoral students and finance faculty 
to investigate whether and how the market reacts to an inexhaustible 
variety of events. 100 Some theoretical-based criticisms of the 
92 See BODIE ET AL., supra note 91, at 353 (explaining that a benchmark return 
must be constructed and “[m]any researchers have used a ‘market model’ to 
estimate abnormal returns”).
93 See id. (equation 11.2).
94 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 66, at 146-47 (explaining the process of 
computing the statistical significance of the abnormal return).
95 See Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Measuring Security Price 
Performance, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 208 (1980) [hereinafter Measuring Security 
Price Performance] (describing the model for risk and market adjusted returns).
96 See Ray Ball, The Theory of Stock Market Efficiency: Accomplishments and 
Limitations, 35 in DONALD H. CHEW, JR., THE NEW CORPORATE FINANCE (2d ed. 
1999) (noting that a new research design called an event study was introduced in 
1969 by Fama, Fischer, Jensen, and Roll).
97 See id. at 39 (describing the establishment of the CRSP data).
98 See Eugene F. Fama et al., supra note 6, at 3 n.6 (“At the time this study was 
conducted, the file covered the period January, 1926 to December, 1960.”); see 
also supra text accompanying note 3.
99 CRSP US Stock Databases, CENTER FOR RES. IN SEC. PRICES,
http://perma.cc/66Y6-VY9S (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
100 See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 149 (describing the wide variety of 
event studies); Bhagat & Romano, supra note 66, at 142 (“The event study 
methodology is well accepted and extensively used in finance. Event study 
19
Klock: Do Class Action Filings Affect Stock Prices? The Stock Market Rea
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
128 Journal of Business & Securities Law [Vol. 15
methodology were published casting some doubt about our ability to 
interpret the results.101 But in 1980, Stephen Brown and Jerold Warner 
published a Monte Carlo simulation study of event study methodology 
and concluded that a simple methodology based on the market model is 
both well specified and relatively powerful under a wide variety of 
conditions; and in special cases, even simpler methods also perform 
well. 102 This study took actual stock return data and then introduced 
abnormal performance of known and varying magnitudes and with 
several hundred simulations tested the ability of event study 
methodology to accurately identify the abnormal performance when it 
existed, and the ability to not find abnormal performance where it did not 
exist.103 The methodology performed very well, and continued to gain 
widespread acceptance.104
In those days, PC’s were non-existent, data storage was 
expensive, and time on mainframe computers was a scarce 
commodity.105 Event studies were conducted using monthly data.106 With 
results have been used in several hundred scholarly articles in leading academic 
finance journals to analyze corporate finance issues . . . .”); Eugene F. Fama, 
Efficient Capital Markets: II 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1600 (1991) (“Event studies are 
now an important part of finance . . . . Now we are overwhelmed with results, 
mostly from event studies.”).
101 See Myron Scholes & Joseph Williams, Estimating Betas from 
Nonsynchronous Data, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 309 (1977) (observing that trading 
in different securities, which is not contemporaneous, introduces a potentially 
serious estimation problem in empirical finance research).
102 Measuring Security Price Performance, supra note 95, at 249.
103 See id. at 212 (discussing the procedure for introducing abnormal 
performance into the data).
104 See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 180 (“Much has been learned from the 
body of research that uses event-study methodology. . . . We expect that event 
studies will continue to be a valuable and widely used tool in economics and 
finance.”).
105 Cf. Mark Klock, Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial 
Sector: Time to Expressly Provide for Private Enforcement Against Aiders and 
Abettors of Securities Fraud, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 437, 480-81 (2011) 
(observing that data processing costs have dropped since the early 1980s).
106 See, e.g., Guy Charest, Dividend Information, Stock Returns and Market 
Efficiency – II, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 297, 299 (1978) (providing description of the 
monthly data used in an event study).
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the invention of the PC, computing time and data storage became cheap, 
and daily data became available.107
In 1985, Brown and Warner again conducted another Monte 
Carlo study of event study methodology using daily data.108 Using daily 
returns they again conclude, “methodologies based on the OLS market 
model and using standard parametric tests are well-specified under a 
variety of conditions.” 109 Event study methodology has continued to 
flourish in the field of finance.110
Event studies are commonly presented as evidence in court.111
“For over two decades, event studies have been prominently used as a 
valuation technique in various litigation matters including securities 
litigation. . . . In securities litigation, event study methodology has been 
widely used in fraud-on-the-market cases as economic evidence of 
materiality, loss causation, and artificial inflation.” 112 In a two-part 
article published in 2002, Roberta Romano and Sanjay Bhagat conducted 
a comprehensive review of academic legal literature based on event 
studies. 113 The authors observed: “Event studies are among the most 
successful uses of econometrics in policy analysis.” 114 They further 
observed that although event studies originated and became widely 
accepted in finance, they are now also widely used in policy analysis and 
particularly in the interaction between financial economics and law.115
107 Cf. Michael C. Lovell, Data Mining, 65 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 1 (1983) 
(stating that technological advances such as computers, databases, and 
automated software have reduced costs).
108 Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Using daily stock returns: The case of 
event studies, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3 (1985) [hereinafter Using daily stock returns].
109 Id. at 25.
110 CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 178 (“Perhaps the most successful 
applications [of event studies] have been in the area of corporate finance. Event 
studies dominate the empirical research in this area.”).
111 See Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, 489 F.App’x 339, 343 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(“Plaintiffs offered the expert report and deposition of Dr. Scott Hakala. Dr. 
Hakala's report included an ‘event study’ . . . .”); see also SEC v. Koenig, 557 
F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing how the SEC introduced an event 
study into evidence).
112 Frank Torchio, Proper Event Study Analysis in Securities Litigation, 35 J. 
CORP. L. 159, 159 (2009).
113 Bhagat & Romano, supra note 66, at 141.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 142 (“The event study methodology is well accepted and extensively 
used in finance. . . . Its use in policy analysis in recent years has become more 
widespread, and it is the interaction between law and financial econometrics that 
is the focus of this review.”).
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All of the statistical analysis for the current study was conducted 
through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). WRDS is the leading 
data research platform for conducting analysis of financial markets and is 
subscribed to by the top business schools in the world.116 It provides an 
interface so that users can retrieve data without time-consuming 
computer programming by inputting the company identifiers and the 
dates to be analyzed. 117 After obtaining the federal court class action 
filing dates, complaint type, survived or dismissed classification, circuit, 
and industrial classification code from the Stanford SCAC, WRDS 
provides an interface that enables the researcher to match company 
names with numerical company identifiers, and then identify those firms 
for which the necessary stock market return data around the filing data is 
available. The stock market data comes from the University of Chicago’s 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data.118 Finally, all of the 
event study analysis and statistics is conducted using a statistical 
software package called Eventus. “Eventus performs state-of-the-art 
event study estimation and testing using the CRSP stock database or 
other stock return data and provides fast event-oriented data retrieval 
from the CRSP stock database,” and can be accessed through WRDS.119
All of the analysis was conducted using a standard event study 
with daily returns and employing the market model with the equal 
weighted stock index as the market portfolio. This methodology has been 
empirically shown to be robust and performs well in Monte Carlo 
simulations.120 In event studies, time is measured relative to the event 
date.121 Hence, the filing date is day zero, days before the filing date are 
negative, and days after the filing date are positive.122 Days are measured 
in trading days.123 Thus, day -10 represents two weeks before the event 
date, and day +10 is two weeks after the event date since the markets are 
116 About WRDS, WHARTON RESEARCH DATA SERVICES, http://perma.cc/Z478-
CGAV (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
117 Id. (“WRDS provides a state-of-the-art interface to a variety for databases, 
simplifying extracting and increasing productivity . . . .”).
118 CRSP US Stock Databases, supra note 99.
119 EVENTUS, http://perma.cc/GFX6-P943 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
120 See Using daily stock returns, supra note 108, at 25 (“[M]ethodologies based 
on the OLS market model and using standard parametric tests are well-specified 
under a variety of conditions.”).
121 Ball, supra note 96, at 38 (explaining the concept of event time).
122 See ROSS ET AL., supra note 70, at 352 (providing an example).
123 See, e.g., CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 153 (using “the 250-trading-day 
period prior to the event window as the estimation window”).
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closed on weekends. 124 The estimation period for estimating the 
parameters of the market model is 255 trading days (approximately one 
year) and ends at day -46 so that the actual event, and any anticipation of 
the event does not contaminate the estimation period for the parameters 
used to calculate abnormal returns.125 If a company does not have return 
data for the entire estimation period, the model is still estimated,
providing that there is a minimum of three data points.
A brief overview of the mechanics of the event study is provided 
herein. For each class action filing in the SCAC for which the required 
data is available in CRSP, the market model is constructed. The market 
model specifies the normal return of the security as a function of that 
security’s alpha, plus the product of the firm’s sensitivity to the market 
portfolio and the return on the market.126 Thus, the normal return on a 
given day t for security i is:
(1) E(Ri,t) =¢i +£iRm,t,
where the parameters ¢ and £ are estimated from a regression of Ri,t on 
Rm,t during the estimation period using data from days -255 through -
46.127 Then for each day during the event period from days -30 to +30 
and for each firm i, the abnormal returns are calculated as:
(2) Ai,t = Ri,t – E(Ri,t).128
In other words, the abnormal for firm i at time t is just the actual return 
less its expected return, and the expected return is based on the market 
model, which models the return of the firm as a function of the market 
124 See Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 8, at 271 n.64 (1985) (explaining 
that 20 trading days is equal to a calendar month).
125 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 66, at 146 (explaining that researchers 
normally estimate the statistical model using data from the period preceding the 
announcement window).
126 See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 155 (equation 4.3.2).
127 Cf. id. at 153 (similarly using 250 trading days in the period preceding the 
event window). I stop the estimation period at day -46 to reduce the possibility 
of anticipation of the event impacting the market model parameter estimates.
128 See ROSS ET AL., supra note 70, at 351 (discussing calculation of the 
abnormal return).
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portfolio return using the firm’s specific parameters ¢ and £.129 This 
accounts for the firms’ own risk and fluctuations in the overall market.130
Abnormal returns for individual securities are not analyzed 
because they are too volatile. 131 Rather, all firms in the sample are 
combined into a portfolio, and the abnormal returns for the portfolio for 
each day in the event window (-30 to +30) are calculated along with test 
statistics.132 Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are also calculated with 
test statistics.133 Although the individual company returns are too volatile 
to analyze, the central limit theorem guarantees that a portfolio of such 
returns will have a normal distribution with a standard deviation 
inversely proportional to the square root of the number of firms in the 
portfolio. 134 Thus, the portfolio abnormal returns have sufficient 
precision to analyze and detect systematic consequences associated with 
filing securities class action claims.
For each of the various event studies, I performed two different 
analyses. One is the analysis of daily abnormal returns from day -30 to 
day +30. In the interest of keeping the reported results such that the 
tables can fit easily on a printed page, I only report the daily abnormal 
returns from days -10 to +10. The second analysis examines cumulative 
abnormal returns, which accumulates abnormal returns over a window.
Three windows are examined: (-30, -2); (-1, 0); and (+1, +30). For each 
abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR), a t-
statistic is reported, which tests the null hypothesis that the returns are 
not statistically different from zero. Also, the number of observations 
used to calculate each test statistic is reported. The number of useable 
observations can change slightly over the period of analysis because 
some firms might have required data for some of the days in the period 
of analysis, but not for all of the days. The convention of examining the 
event window (-1, 0) is aptly explained by Professor Ross:
129 Using daily stock returns, supra note 108, at 7 (equation 4).
130 Measuring Security Price Performance, supra note 95, at 213-14 (discussing 
risk and market adjusted returns and the use of the market model).
131 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 66, at 147 (explaining that individual 
abnormal returns are not analyzed due to their large standard errors).
132 See id. (explaining how abnormal returns for a sample of firms are averaged 
in event time).
133 See generally CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 160-66 (explaining and 
illustrating with an example the use of cumulative abnormal returns).
134 See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 13, at 114 (explaining that as a result 
of the central limit theorem, the standard error of an average of random variables 
will be normally distributed and proportional to 1/Ĝn).
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[T]he announcement date is generally taken in 
academic studies to be the publication date of the story 
in The Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Then consider a 
company announcing a dividend omission [or the filing 
of a class action lawsuit] via a press release at noon on 
Tuesday. The stock should fall on Tuesday. The 
announcement will be reported in the WSJ on 
Wednesday, because the Tuesday edition of the WSJ has 
already been printed. For this firm, the stock price falls 
on the day before the announcement in the WSJ.
Alternatively, imagine another firm announcing 
a dividend omission via a press release on Tuesday at 8 
p.m. Since the stock market is closed at that late hour, 
the stock price will fall on Wednesday. Because the WSJ
will report the announcement on Wednesday, the stock 
price falls on the day of the announcement in the WSJ.135
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS & ANALYSIS
A. Baseline Study of all Firms
Table 2 reports the results from the baseline event study. This 
study uses all available observations on securities class action filings for 
which the required market data exists. There are a maximum of 845
filings in this analysis. The daily test statistics show a strong negative 
abnormal return that is significant at the one percent level every day from 
day -9 to day +1. There is one positive significant abnormal return on 
day +10, but analysis of the cumulative abnormal returns does not reveal 
a significantly positive abnormal return after the filing. Additionally, 
analysis of the cumulative average abnormal returns shows a strong 
negative cumulative abnormal return over the interval (-1, 0), as well as 
over the interval (-30, -2).
There are three conclusions that I drew from the baseline event 
study. The first conclusion is that the filing of a class action lawsuit 
results in a permanent drop in the value of the company. The second 
conclusion is that the valuation drop is completed very quickly after the 
filing occurs. The third conclusion is that there is some advance 
anticipation of class action filings in the stock market prior to the actual 
filing date.
135 ROSS ET AL., supra note 70, at 352 n.11.
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TABLE 2
Filing Date Abnormal Returns for the Full Sample
Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns
Event Date N abnormal   t-statistic
return(%)
-10 845 -0.40% -2.185**
-9 845 -0.52% -2.878***
-8 845 -0.46% -2.503***
-7 845 -0.50% -2.768***
-6 845 -0.70% -3.836***
-5 845 -0.44% -2.441***
-4 845 -1.14% -6.282***
-3 843 -0.85% -4.667***
-2 842 -0.70% -3.858***
-1 842 -1.41% -7.729***
0 840 -0.61% -3.350***
1 840 -0.90% -4.918***
2 840 0.07% 0.386
3 840 -0.35% -1.899**
4 838 -0.03% -0.188
5 838 -0.33% -1.794**
6 838 -0.05% -0.255
7 838 0.16% 0.873
8 837 -0.01% -0.079
9 833 0.20% 1.099
10 833 0.43% 2.387***
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Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Days            N                CAAR       t-statistic           
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
(-30,-2)      845               -9.97%     -10.234***          
(-1,0)        842               -1.82%     -7.829***             
(+1,+30)      842                0.58%     0.792               
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance for a 
one-tail test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
B. Filing Type—10(b) or Not
Tables 3 and 4 are designed to provide some insight as to 
whether the type of filing matters. By far the most prevalent filings 
involve claims under § 10(b).136 Since § 10(b) is the general catch-all 
provision for fraud, 137 one might expect that actions involving such 
claims are likely to obtain larger damages than actions that are based on 
more narrow claims. Allegations of fraud are likely to damage a firm’s
reputation and valuation more severely than an allegation of breach of 
fiduciary duty or an omission in a registration statement. Additionally, 
claims that are based solely on violations of the ’33 Act will tend to be 
against smaller corporations, and lead to smaller settlements. There are 
723 observations on filings that involve § 10(b) and 122 observations on 
all other claim types. Since the number of observations for each of the 
other four claim types that were categorized is small, those filings were 
not further segregated by type of claim.
Table 3 displays the results of the event study on the § 10(b) 
filings and Table 4 displays the results for all others. The results support 
the conjecture that 10(b) claims will have a more adverse impact on 
valuation. Table 3 shows that firms that were sued under § 10(b) had 
large negative abnormal returns that are statistically significant at the one 
136 See supra Table 1 (showing that 723 of 845 observations involve a 10(b) 
claim).
137 See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its 
Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade after the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1489, 1492 n.12 (2006) (“In the case of secondary market fraud, suits are 
typically brought under Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006), which was 
promulgated under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 
78j(b) (2000). In the case of fraud arising in a public offering, suits are brought 
under §§ 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§
77k, 77l(a)(2), as well as under Rule 10b-5.”).
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percent level every day from days -10 to +1. The cumulative abnormal 
return for the six weeks leading up to the filing is nearly -13%, and
exceeds -2% for the two-day window of (-1,0). Both are highly 
significant, and well beyond the one percent level.
Table 4 reveals that the other firms do not have statistically 
significant abnormal returns at or after the event date. Prior to the event 
date, the abnormal returns fluctuate between positive and negative, with 
the cumulative balance being positive. This indicates that these firms 
seem to experience a period of volatility in the stock market prior to the 
filing date.
TABLE 3
Filing Date Abnormal Returns for Filings Involving § 10(b)
Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns
Event Date N abnormal   t-statistic
return(%)
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-10 722 -0.61% -2.943***
-9 722 -0.65% -3.122***
-8 721 -0.51% -2.463***
-7 721 -0.62% -2.981***
-6 721 -0.65% -3.149***
-5 721 -0.64% -3.067***
-4 721 -1.24% -5.980***
-3 717 -0.81% -3.908***
-2 716 -1.20% -5.797***
-1 716 -1.78% -8.567***
0 714 -0.63% -3.034***
1 714 -0.84% -4.055***
2 714 0.16% 0.765
3 714 -0.43% -2.065**
4 712 0.03% 0.133
5 712 -0.19% -0.928
6 713 -0.04% -0.197
7 713 0.14% 0.652
8 713 0.06% 0.306
9 711 0.13% 0.644
10 711 0.41% 1.993**
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Days            N             CAAR       t-statistic           
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
(-30,-2)      723   -12.86% -11.467***          
(-1,0)        716          -2.19% -8.117***             
(+1,+30)      716          -0.40% -1.138               
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance for a one-tail 
test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
TABLE 4
Filing Date Abnormal Returns for Filings NOT Involving § 10(b)
Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns
Event Date N abnormal   t-statistic
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return(%)
-10 122 0.88% 2.04**
-9 122 0.16% 0.363
-8 122 -0.11% -0.255
-7 122 0.20% 0.477
-6 122 -0.97% -2.246**
-5 122 0.79% 1.84**
-4 122 -0.65% -1.518*
-3 122 -1.15% -2.68***
-2 122 2.12% 4.94***
-1 122 0.81% 1.889**
0 122 -0.52% -1.212
1 122 -1.20% -2.781***
2 122 -0.57% -1.32*
3 122 0.13% 0.293
4 122 -0.38% -0.874
5 122 -1.16% -2.692***
6 121 -0.05% -0.123
7 121 0.30% 0.694
8 120 -0.42% -0.972
9 118 0.51% 1.178
10 118 0.67% 1.567*
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Days            N              CAAR       t-statistic          
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(-30,-2)     122              6.35%     4.917***     
(-1,0)       122              0.27%     0.794        
(+1,+30)     122              1.26%     0.844      
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance for a one-tail 
test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
C. Filing Merits
Tables 5 and 6 are designed to address the question as to whether 
the market is able to distinguish between frivolous and merit-based class 
actions. Using dismissal of a claim as a proxy for frivolous behavior, the 
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sample is split between cases that were dismissed, and cases that either 
settled or otherwise survived (meaning that a settlement is almost 
certainly imminent). Obviously, the market cannot observe dismissal at 
the time of filing. However, if dismissal is a strong indication that the 
claim was frivolous when filed, there should be a weaker reaction to the 
filing if the market is able to detect the frivolousness of the complaint.
These results are very interesting. They indicate that even 
frivolous lawsuits result in a statistically significant drop in the value of 
the firm, but the magnitude of the drop is substantially larger for the 
filings that are not frivolous. This suggests that the market has a modest 
ability to discern meritorious filings from frivolous filings, but frivolous 
filings still damage firm value at a statistically significant level. We lack 
data on the average cost of defending a class action that is ultimately 
dismissed, so we cannot ascertain whether the drop is merely due to 
expected litigation costs or something more than that, which might 
include damage to the corporate reputation.
Table 5 reports the results for the filings that are not frivolous 
(not dismissed during the period of analysis). Every day during the 
window (-10, +1) the abnormal return is negative. Ten of the eleven days 
during the window (-9, +1), the negative abnormal returns are 
statistically significant at a conventional level, and eight of those ten are 
significant at the one percent level. The cumulative abnormal returns at 
the filing and preceding the filing are large (in absolute value) and highly 
significant. There is a small positive cumulative abnormal return in the 
thirty trading days following the filing, but it is not statistically 
significant, and it does not begin to make up for the large drop in value
leading up to and including the filing. The cumulative abnormal return 
for window (-30, 0) is -13.6% whereas the cumulative abnormal return 
for window (+1, +30) is 0.78%.
Table 6 reports the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns 
for the filings that were subsequently dismissed. Although still negative 
and significant, they are noticeably smaller. Additionally, there is no 
significant cumulative change in value during the period subsequent to 
filing. The negative abnormal return for these firms over the window (-
30, 0) is -9.43%. This informs us that on average, the stock value for the 
merit-based filings dropped over 44% more than the value for the 
frivolous filings.138
TABLE 5
Filing Date Abnormal Returns for Filings which Survived
138 13.6/9.43=1.44.
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Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns
Event Date N abnormal   t-statistic
return(%)
-10 502 -0.27% -1.088
-9 502 -0.47% -1.909**
-8 501 -0.34% -1.403*
-7 501 -0.60% -2.462***
-6 501 -1.04% -4.254***
-5 501 -0.20% -0.833
-4 501 -1.12% -4.571***
-3 499 -1.08% -4.382***
-2 498 -1.18% -4.822***
-1 498 -1.70% -6.934***
0 497 -0.97% -3.941***
1 497 -1.02% -4.145***
2 497 0.20% 0.832
3 497 -0.25% -1.016
4 495 -0.10% -0.424
5 495 -0.25% -1.014
6 495 0.21% 0.859
7 495 0.39% 1.604*
8 495 0.21% 0.84
9 492 0.22% 0.904
10 492 0.06% 0.248
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Days          N             CAAR         t-statistic           
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(-30,-2)    502          -11.04%   -15.574***
(-1,0)      498           -2.56%   -13.817***
(+1,+30)    498            0.78%     1.063
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance for a one-tail 
test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
TABLE 6
Filing Date Abnormal Returns for Filings which Were Dismissed
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Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns
Event Date N abnormal   t-statistic
return(%)
-10 342 -0.58% -2.269**
-9 342 -0.62%
-
2.423***
-8 342 -0.61%
-
2.378***
-7 342 -0.34% -1.34*
-6 342 -0.19% -0.745
-5 342 -0.76% -2.952***
-4 342 -1.20% -4.679***
-3 340 -0.54% -2.114**
-2 340 -0.04% -0.139
-1 340 -0.96% -3.72***
0 339 -0.09% -0.366
1 339 -0.71% -2.759***
2 339 -0.17% -0.659
3 339 -0.49% -1.91**
4 339 0.08% 0.292
5 339 -0.46% -1.778**
6 339 -0.41% -1.605*
7 339 -0.18% -0.717
8 338 -0.32% -1.23
9 337 0.14% 0.525
10 337 1.02% 3.962***
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Days            N              CAAR         t-statistic
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(-30,-2)      343            -8.56%   -11.486***
(-1,0)        340            -0.87%   -4.472***
(+1,+30)      340             0.18%    0.238
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance for a one-tail 
test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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D. Circuit Court
Tables 7-9 are designed to address whether the stock market 
reactions are different depending on where the claims are filed. One 
might expect the market to react differently to claims filed in different 
geographic areas because some circuits are more or less hostile to 
securities class action claims. 139 However, we have to be extremely 
careful not to draw causal inferences from these results.140 There are too 
many factors at play that cannot be adequately controlled for.
For example, results could differ in one circuit because the most 
dominant law practices in securities class actions are housed in that 
circuit. For now, we will be content with merely uncovering the stylized 
facts as to whether there are differences. Since the Ninth Circuit and the 
Second Circuit are the two circuits with the greatest number of class 
action filings,141 we examine those two separately and combine all the 
others into a residual category of all other circuits. The main conclusion 
from this analysis is that filings in the Ninth Circuit lead to valuation 
drops that are more than double those for filings in the Second Circuit.
Table 7 examines 189 filings in the Ninth Circuit. Every daily 
abnormal return from days -10 to +1 is negative and significant at the 5% 
level or better. More informative are the cumulative abnormal returns,
which are all negative and statistically significant, even for the post event 
window. Stocks incur a cumulative -12.95% abnormal return during 
window (-30, -2); -2.74% during window (-1, 0); and -2.21% during 
window (+1, +30). The fact that firms that have securities class actions 
filed against them in the Ninth Circuit continue to experience negative 
abnormal returns after the filing date is interesting in itself, and suggests 
that shorting these companies as soon as the filings occur could be 
modestly profitable.142
139 See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg & Dustin L. Appel, A Prolonged Slump for 
“Plaintiff-Pitchers”: The Narrow “Strike Zone” for Securities Plaintiffs in the 
Fourth Circuit, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1923, 1978 (2010) (asserting that the Fourth 
Circuit has been more hostile to securities fraud cases than other circuits).
140 See THOMAS H. WONNACOTT & RONALD J. WONNACOTT, REGRESSION: A
SECOND COURSE IN STATISTICS 173 (reprinted, 1987) (“Even though correlation 
or regression may have established that two variables move together, no claim 
can be made that this necessarily indicates cause and effect.”).
141 See supra Table 1 (showing that more than fifty percent of the filings came 
from the Second and Ninth Circuits).
142 See ROSS ET AL., supra note 70, at 343 (“If the price of the stock takes several 
days to adjust, trading profits would be available to investors . . . .”).
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Table 8 examines 312 filings in the Second Circuit. The daily 
abnormal returns have fewer significant values at lower levels of 
significance and are more erratic. The cumulative abnormal returns 
indicate no statistically significant abnormality in the event window (-1, 
0) or the post event window (+1, +30). There is a statistically significant 
negative abnormal return in the pre-event window (-30, -2), indicating 
some market anticipation of filings in the Second Circuit. The magnitude 
of that reaction however, is -6%, which is large, but less than half the 
magnitude for Ninth Circuit filings.143
Table 9 reports the results of analysis of 344 filings in all other 
circuits combined. Every daily abnormal return from day -10 to day +1 is 
negative, and eleven of the twelve are statistically significant. The 
cumulative abnormal returns for the pre-event, event, and post-event 
windows are -11.77%, -2.69%, and +1.68%, respectively, and all are 
statistically significant. The magnitudes for the pre-event and event 
windows are very close to the values for the Ninth Circuit, but the 
performance in the post-event window is markedly different. It appears 
that the Ninth Circuit is special in that firms continue to underperform 
the market for weeks after filing, and the Second Circuit is special in that 
the pre-event abnormal performance is markedly smaller, and the actual 
filing event has no statistically discernible effect.
TABLE 7
Filing Date Abnormal Returns for Filings in the Ninth Circuit
Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns
Event Date N abnormal   t-statistic
return(%)
-10 189 -0.73% -2.161**
-9 189 -1.32% -3.919***
-8 188 -1.45% -4.308***
-7 188 -1.64% -4.864***
-6 188 -1.30% -3.85***
-5 188 -0.70% -2.073**
-4 188 -1.29% -3.837***
-3 187 -1.73% -5.135***
-2 186 -1.49% -4.411***
143 Compare infra Table 7 with infra Table 8, which shows that Panel B CAARs 
for windows (-30, -2) are -12.95% and -6%, respectively.
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-1 186 -1.77% -5.256***
0 186 -1.26% -3.748***
1 186 -1.19% -3.542***
2 186 0.35% 1.03
3 186 -0.57% -1.689**
4 185 0.07% 0.196
5 185 -0.19% -0.551
6 186 0.02% 0.048
7 186 -0.30% -0.886
8 185 0.19% 0.55
9 182 -0.33% -0.989
10 182 0.27% 0.801
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Days            N CAAR        t statistic
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
(-30,-2)     189            -12.95%   -10.470***
(-1,0)       186             -2.74%    -8.528***
(+1,+30)     187             -2.21%    -1.768**
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance for a one-tail 
test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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TABLE 8
Filing Date Abnormal Returns for Filings win the Second Circuit
Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns
Event Date N abnormal  t-statistic
return(%)
-10 311 0.03% 0.078
-9 311 -0.13% -0.38
-8 311 -0.03% -0.078
-7 311 0.06% 0.167
-6 311 -0.59% -1.756**
-5 311 0.08% 0.226
-4 311 -0.64% -1.912**
-3 311 -0.77% -2.319**
-2 311 -0.45% -1.35*
-1 311 -0.80% -2.388***
0 310 0.52% 1.564*
1 310 -0.77% -2.294**
2 310 0.16% 0.486
3 310 -0.20% -0.605
4 309 -0.11% -0.341
5 309 -0.46% -1.382*
6 309 -0.05% -0.143*
7 309 0.51% 1.522
8 309 -0.18% -0.525
9 308 0.56% 1.672
10 308 0.63% 1.881**
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Days            N CAAR        t-statistic
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
(-30,-2)    312           -6.00%         -6.853***                
(-1,0)      311           -0.22%         -0.950
(+1,+30)    310            0.50%          0.566                    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance for a one-tail 
test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
TABLE 9
Filing Date Abnormal Returns for Filings in All Other Circuits
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Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns
Event Date N abnormal  t-statistic
return(%)
-10 344 -0.59% -2.467***
-9 344 -0.46% -1.924**
-8 344 -0.29% -1.214
-7 344 -0.38% -1.568*
-6 344 -0.47% -1.961**
-5 344 -0.74% -3.071***
-4 344 -1.55% -6.43***
-3 341 -0.46% -1.915**
-2 341 -0.54% -2.254**
-1 341 -1.75% -7.259***
0 340 -1.29% -5.375***
1 340 -0.84% -3.506***
2 340 -0.21% -0.866
3 340 -0.36% -1.49*
4 340 -0.01% -0.039
5 340 -0.30% -1.237
6 339 -0.07% -0.292
7 339 0.09% 0.379
8 339 0.04% 0.184
9 339 0.13% 0.532
10 339 0.39% 1.603*
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Days            N CAAR        t-statistic
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
(-30,-2)    344          -11.77%   -16.000***
(-1,0)      341           -2.69%   -13.990***
(+1,+30)    341            1.68%     2.253**  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance for a one-tail 
test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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E. Economic Sector
Tables 10-14 break the filings down into different economic 
sectors. There are important differences between the sectors that affect 
the market’s ability to value them. 144 Manufacturing, agriculture, and 
natural resources such as timber involve buildings, machines, and land,
which are somewhat easier to see and value than assets in other 
sectors.145 The value of service companies depends in large part on their
customer base and customer loyalty, which are more difficult to 
assess.146 Transportation services are closely linked to the price of oil,
and hence subject to more than average volatility.147
Table 10 displays results for all economic sectors that do not 
involve services. This includes retail, manufacturing, agriculture, and 
natural resource intensive industries.148 The daily abnormal returns are 
both negative and statistically significant for days -9 through +1. The 
cumulative abnormal returns for both the event window and pre-event 
window are large, and highly significant. After comparison with the 
tables for the service sectors, it is clear that the negative reaction to 
securities class action filings is larger in the non-service sector. There is 
no obvious reason provided by economic theory as to why this should be 
the case. One conjecture might be that fraud in the service sector tends to 
involve fictitious arms-length contracts or customers, whereas fraud in 
the non-service sector might tend to involve concealment of liability for 
dangerous products. The latter is potentially more damaging to a 
corporation. A comprehensive analysis of this reasoning would require 
reading hundreds of pleadings and attempting to catalog the principal 
basis for the claims. 
144 See Mark Klock & Katherine I. Gleason, Intangible Capital in the 
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Industry, 46 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 300, 301-02 
(2006) (explaining that sources of intangible vary by industry and affect firm 
value).
145 See Robert Hall, Struggling to Understand the Stock Market, 91 AM. ECON.
REV. 1, 5-6 (2001) (explaining that variations in value across industries occur as 
a result of differences in real stuff and differences in intangibles).
146 See, e.g., id. at 2 (noting the difficulty in placing a value on Yahoo).
147 See Michael S. Haigh & David A. Bessler, Causality and Price Discovery: An 
Application of Directed Acyclic Graphs, 77 J. BUS. 1099, 1099 (2004) (taking 
notice of “the fact that freight rates are notoriously volatile”).
148 Division of Corporation Finance: Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) 
Code List, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://perma.cc/YD8V-9CD7
(last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (The codes of interest are codes 10-39 and 50-59 at 
the two-digit level).
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TABLE 10
Filing Date Abnormal Returns for Filings in Non-Services
(retail, manufacturing, agricultural & resource intensive; SIC 01-39 & 
50-59)
Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns
Event Date N abnormal  t-statistic
return(%)
-10 399 -0.12% -0.501
-9 399 -0.44% -1.814**
-8 399 -0.36% -1.461*
-7 399 -0.61% -2.509***
-6 399 -1.23% -5.058***
-5 399 -0.45% -1.834**
-4 399 -1.41% -5.786***
-3 398 -1.46% -6.002***
-2 397 -0.79% -3.245***
-1 397 -1.85% -7.606***
0 397 -0.47% -1.938**
1 397 -1.15% -4.704***
2 397 0.38% 1.556*
3 397 -0.15% -0.62
4 396 0.21% 0.872
5 396 -0.22% -0.898
6 396 0.12% 0.482
7 396 0.01% 0.026
8 396 0.01% 0.03
9 393 -0.03% -0.105
10 393 0.28% 1.158
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Days            N CAAR        t-statistic
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
(-30,-2)    400          -11.68%   -14.806***
(-1,0)      397           -1.89%    -9.160***
(+1,+30)    397            0.82%     1.018   
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance for a one-tail 
test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 11 displays results for all services, including financial 
services, transportation services, and communication services. The 
service sector is slightly larger than non-services, but not that far from a 
fifty-fifty split (53% to 47%).149 The service sector continues to display 
negative and generally significant abnormal returns before and 
immediately around the event, but the cumulative abnormal return for the 
pre-event window is noticeably smaller than for the non-service sector,
which indicates these firms do not lose as much of their value after 
adjusting for market fluctuations.
TABLE 11
Filing Date Abnormal Returns for Filings in All Services
(transportation, communication, financial, & services; SIC 40-49 & 60-
89)
Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns
Event Date N abnormal  t-statistic
return(%)
-10 445 -0.64% -2.533***
-9 445 -0.61% -2.419***
-8 444 -0.54% -2.134**
-7 444 -0.40% -1.575*
-6 444 -0.22% -0.862
-5 444 -0.41% -1.637*
-4 444 -0.93% -3.664***
-3 441 -0.32% -1.25
-2 441 -0.65% -2.582***
-1 441 -0.99% -3.921***
0 439 -0.74% -2.931***
1 439 -0.66% -2.624***
2 439 -0.24% -0.961
3 439 -0.53% -2.078**
4 438 -0.25% -0.996
5 438 -0.44% -1.731**
6 438 -0.19% -0.741
149 See supra Table 1 (comparing 445 out of 845 with 400 out of 845).
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7 438 0.30% 1.174
8 437 -0.02% -0.071
9 436 0.38% 1.496*
10 436 0.60% 2.382***
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
                         
Days            N CAAR        t-statistic
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
(-30,-2)    445           -8.53%   -12.588***
(-1,0)      441           -1.75%    -9.922***
(+1,+30)    441            0.26%     0.368   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance for a one-tail 
test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Tables 12-14 display results for various components of the 
service sector. Table 12 shows results for financial services alone. Again, 
this sector shows generally negative and significant abnormal returns 
before and around the filing. The cumulative abnormal returns for the 
event and pre-event windows are highly significant. They are also larger 
(in absolute value) than that of other service sectors, but smaller than for 
non-services. The finding that the market reacts more negatively to fraud 
in the financial sector than in other service areas is in accordance with 
conventional wisdom that fraud by financial intermediaries is especially 
troublesome.150
150 See, e.g., L. Randall Wray, Global Financial Crisis: Causes, Bail-Out, 
Future Draft, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1101, 1109 (2012) (“It would not be too 
extreme to say that fraud has become normal business practice in the financial 
sector.”).
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TABLE 12
Filing Date Abnormal Returns for Filings in Financial Services
(SIC 60-69)
Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns
Event Date N abnormal  t-statistic
return(%)
-10 162 -0.74% -2.321**
-9 162 0.03% 0.104
-8 162 -1.05% -3.305***
-7 162 -0.67% -2.086**
-6 162 0.42% 1.331*
-5 162 -0.94% -2.958***
-4 162 -1.08% -3.4***
-3 162 -0.07% -0.233
-2 162 -1.62% -5.083***
-1 162 -0.66% -2.083**
0 161 -1.04% -3.257***
1 161 -0.97% -3.032***
2 161 -0.48% -1.497*
3 161 -0.91% -2.869***
4 161 -0.41% -1.276
5 161 -0.73% -2.288**
6 160 -0.27% -0.86
7 160 0.14% 0.443
8 160 -0.47% -1.481*
9 160 0.36% 1.14
10 160 0.02% 0.073
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Days            N CAAR        t-statistic
(-30,-2)     162           -9.27%  -10.884***
(-1,0)       162           -1.77%   -7.918***
(+1,+30)     161            0.34%    0.372      
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance for a one-tail 
test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 13 provides results for the service sector defined as SIC 
codes 7000 and up. This category excludes transportation and 
communications services, as well as the financial sector. Again, the 
results reveal several negative and significant abnormal returns before 
the filing, and a negative and significant abnormal return on the filing 
date. The cumulative abnormal returns for the event window and pre-
event window are negative and highly significant, but the total 
cumulative negative abnormal return over these windows is smaller than 
for any other sector.
Transportation and communications services as defined by SIC 
two-digit codes between 40 and 49 have the smallest number of 
observations with just 77. Rather than run the analysis on the small 
subsample, Table 14 reports the analysis for all services excluding 
transportation and communication services. These are defined by SIC 
two-digit codes above 60.151 Again, we observe generally negative and 
significant daily abnormal returns in the event and pre-event windows, 
and highly significant negative cumulative abnormal returns over this 
period. The fact that the cumulative abnormal returns in Table 14—
which excludes transportation and communications—are smaller than 
those in Table 11—which includes them—indicates that transportation 
and communications firms, like financial firms, react stronger to class 
action filings than other types of service firms.
TABLE 13
Filing Date Abnormal Returns for Filings in Services
(excludes transportation, communications and finance; includes SIC 70-
89)
Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns
Event Date N abnormal t-statistic
return(%)
-10 206 -0.65% -1.602*
-9 206 -0.61% -1.497*
-8 205 -0.44% -1.072
-7 205 0.03% 0.073
-6 205 -0.29% -0.711
-5 205 0.31% 0.759
151 See generally Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) Code List, supra note 
148.
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-4 205 -0.99% -2.417***
-3 205 -0.60% -1.475*
-2 205 0.15% 0.357
-1 205 -1.58% -3.865***
0 204 -0.77% -1.892**
1 204 -0.33% -0.81
2 204 0.00% -0.005
3 204 -0.37% -0.917
4 204 -0.08% -0.185
5 204 0.00% 0.001
6 205 -0.15% -0.367
7 205 0.37% 0.911
8 204 0.24% 0.596
9 203 0.22% 0.551
10 203 0.95% 2.314**
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
                         
Days            N CAAR        t-statistic
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
(-30,-2)    206           -5.56%    -4.184***
(-1,0)      205           -2.12%    -6.108***
(+1,+30)    206            0.02%     0.005       
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance for a one-tail 
test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
TABLE 14
Filing Date Abnormal Returns for Filings in Finance & Services
(excludes transportation & communication services; includes SIC 60-89)
Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns
Event Date N abnormal t-statistic
return(%)
-10 368 -0.69%
-
2.499***
-9 368 -0.33% -1.183
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-8 367 -0.71%
-
2.563***
-7 367 -0.28% -1.0
-6 367 0.03% 0.091
-5 367 -0.24% -0.878
-4 367 -1.03% -3.718***
-3 367 -0.37% -1.334*
-2 367 -0.63% -2.289**
-1 367 -1.17% -4.241***
0 365 -0.89% -3.213***
1 365 -0.61% -2.207**
2 365 -0.21% -0.764
3 365 -0.61% -2.212**
4 365 -0.22% -0.801
5 365 -0.32% -1.161
6 365 -0.20% -0.738
7 365 0.27% 0.978
8 364 -0.07% -0.257
9 363 0.29% 1.033
10 363 0.54% 1.945**
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Days            N CAAR        t-statistic
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
(-30,-2)    368          -7.72%   -10.356***
(-1,0)      367          -1.92%    -9.828***
(+1,+30)    367           0.20%     0.253  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance for a one-tail 
test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This study has endeavored to conduct and document a replicable 
event study on securities class action filings subsequent to the PSLRA 
using the largest available set of data. A large data set provides the most 
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power in test statistics, meaning that we are less likely to accept a null 
hypothesis of no impact when in fact the event does have an impact on 
the value of the companies’ stocks. 152 We do find that, overall, all 
securities class action filings have a negative impact at the filing date, 
and there is a statistically significant decline in value before filing occurs.
This suggests that the market partially anticipates the filing of securities 
class actions. We also find in the baseline case that the full drop in 
valuation because of the class action is completed one day after the filing, 
and the market does not over-react because there is no subsequent 
statistically significant bounce back towards prior valuation.
Interestingly, the greatest decline in stock value occurs for firms 
that have a 10(b) claim against them. Other types of claims that are not 
coupled with a 10(b) claim do not result in as large of drops. Also 
noteworthy is the fact that frivolous suits, defined as those that are 
subsequently dismissed on motion, also cause a statistically significant 
drop in value, but not as large as merit-based suits. This might suggest 
that the market has some ability to distinguish between frivolous and 
non-frivolous suits, but even frivolous suits are costly to corporate value.
We also note that the circuit filed where the complaint is filed is 
correlates with the valuation change. Filings in the Ninth Circuit have a 
valuation drop that is much larger than those in the Second Circuit, and 
suffer some persistence in a continued valuation drop weeks after the
filing. The economic sector also makes a difference to the magnitude of 
the valuation drop. Non-service firms lose more value than service firms.
Within service firms, financial firms lose most. Excluding financial 
service firms, transportation and communications service firms lose more 
value than other types of service firms.
Securities class action lawsuits provide benefits in the form of 
deterring fraud, redressing fraud, and promoting investor confidence in 
the market. 153 They also come with costs associated with attracting 
nuisance suits, which damage value either through resource expenditures 
or damage to corporate reputation.154 An optimal level of class action 
filings would result in marginal costs that equal the marginal savings.155
152 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 66, at 149 (“[T]he power of the event 
study diminishes as the sample size decreases.”).
153 See Stout, supra note 42, at 714-15 (discussing how private plaintiffs’ 
lawyers produce value through a reduction in fraud).
154 See id. (mentioning the costs of strike suits related to securities fraud).
155 See Mark Klock, Two Possible Answers to the Enron Experience: Will It Be 
Regulation of Fortune Tellers or Rebirth of Secondary Liability, 28 J. CORP. L. 
69, 101 (2002) (“Only optimal regulation provides solutions to real market 
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Whether the total costs exceed the total benefits is a topic that will surely 
continue to be debated, but it is clear from the data that the magnitude of 
both costs and benefits is non-trivial.
failures. Like any optimization problem, the solution is likely to involve a 
balancing of marginal resources against marginal benefits.”).
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